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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Respondent has misstated the issues presented for
review and misstated the facts of this case.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Appellant asserts that the brief of Respondent
misstates and misrepresents that which is brought before this
Court/ the record and the facts of this case.

Therefore/ by way

of this Reply Brief/ Appellant shall clarify that which has been
clouded/ by issue.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case
is presented in the Appendix of Appellant's Petition.
JURISDICTION
Respondent has stipulated to the jurisdiction presented
by Appellant in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory and other provisions are set
forth in Appellant's Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case has been correctly stated in Appellant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tne facts of this case have been correctly set forth in
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

1

POINT I - CUSTODY
P£RT A.

STIPULATIONS

Respondent and the Utah Court of Appeals claim that the
proposed stipulations should be used to determine if custody is
at issue.

Ebbert v. Ebbert/ Case No. 860299-CA (Utah App. 1987).

This is improper and cannot stand.

The role/ scope and weight of

stipulations are clearly defined in Brown v. Brown/ 744 P.2d 333
(Utah App. 1987).

See Appendix.

A review of this case will show that these two opinions
create a direct conflict between two panels of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
Further/ the Utah Court of Appeals and Respondent
ignore that which is in the proposed stipulations which
demonstrates that custody was in fact at issue and tried.

A

review of these shows absolutely that Appellant retained "all
parental entitlements" in the last four drafts of the proposed
stipulations.

The final decree does not award Appellant "all

parental entitlements/" but instead/ severely limits his parental
rights.
Therefore/ the Utah Court of Appeals has decided this
case in conflict with Utah law.

If not/ there would be a record

of the parties' agreement to the limitation of Appellant's rights
or a court order doing same.

Whereas/ the parties never agreed

to this limitation and the trial court limited Appellant's
2

rights/ custody was tried.
Where parental rights are limited by a trial court/ as
in this case/ two things are required in law.

First and

foremost/ there must be a hearing on parental fitness.

Second/

there must be proper findings of fact which identify why there is
a limitation.
The trial court failed to do either/ and the Utah Court
of Appeals has upheld these errors of law.
PART B.

PLEADINGS

Appellant has attached within the Appendix of this
Reply Brief copies of the pleadings in totality.

A review of

these will demonstrate beyond question that the pleadings place
custody at issue twice.

First/ by Respondent's Counterclaim/

which denied the offer of custody which was made subject to
liberal visitation.

Second/ when Appellant filed a timely Answer

to Respondent's Counterclaim/ wherein Appellant denied Respondent
should have custody.

See Appendix.

Both the Utah Court of Appeals and Respondent have
misstated and misrepresented the pleadings by ignoring both of
the above-mentioned points wherein custody was placed at issue by
the pleading of both parties.
POINT II - ASSETS
Respondent's brief again misstates and misrepresents to
this Court that which is brought before it in the petition of the
3

Appellant.

A fast review of Appellant's brief/ Petition/ at

pages 16/ 17 and 18 shows without question that Utah law is in
conflict with the decision in this case and further that the
Utah Court of Appeals has failed to answer that which was brought
before it for resolution.
POINT III - BIAS
Respondent argues that the Utah Court of Appeals was
correct in its determination that it could not review the issue
of bias because same was not testified to.
misstatement of fact.
thereof.

First/ this is a

Appellant testified to bias and the harm

(R. at 579-580)
Not only did Appellant preserve this issue by way of

testimony/ this decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is in
direct conflict with the decision of another panel of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

See,

Marchant v. Marchant/ Case No. 860250-CA

(Utah App. 1987)/ which was filed less than 60 days before the
filing of the case at bar/ sets a totally different standard for
review of bias and did not require an objection at trial.
POINT IV - CHILD SUPPORT
Respondent falsely and incorrectly claims that
Appellant argues the wealth of parents should be placed upon
Respondent.

This is not what Appellant has ever questioned.

Appellant submits the errors in law of the Utah Court of Appeals
as follows:
4

1)

The Utah Court of Appeals answered a question which

was not brought before it for review.
2)

The Utah Court of Appeals decided/ in conflict with

Utah law/ that the discretionary income of Respondent should not
be considered, while all income of the Appellant should be
considered.
3)

The Utah Court of Appeals decided in conflict with

another panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that Utah Code
Annotated 78-45-7(1)(2) need not be followed by upholding the
equalization of income methodology employed by the trial court,
which included the use of false figures without any consideration
to the required factors set forth in the above-mentioned State
Code.
These conflicts in law are brought forth by Judge
Bench's statements from the bench during oral arguments, Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 and Stroud v. Stroud, Case No. 860049-CA
(Utah App. 1987).
Should these errors be allowed to stand, parents will
be denied their right to support their children to the best of
their ability.

The State may well receive the burden of

supporting children when, in fact, the parents have ample funds
to care for their children and themselves.
CONCLUSION
Appellant prays that the Utah Supreme Court will now
5

exercise its judicial discretion by granting a review of the
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals and order a new trial to
correct these errors or decide this case in a manner which is
consistent with the laws of Utah.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this Z^7^

day of February,

1988.
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, on this / £ - ^
of February, 1988.
James. P. Cowley, Esq.
William H. Christensen, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant - Respondent
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX A

COMPLAINT
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
ANSWER

Kenn M. Hanson (1355)
HASKINS & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: 268-3994

^ ^ ^ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ "

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT
Plaintiff,
vs.

COMPLAINT

BARBARA ANN EBBERT

Civil No.

7

:85

21

Defendant.

Comes now the above-named Plaintiff and for cause of action
alleges and complains against the Defendant as follows:
Provi sions Relating to Jurisdiction
1.

That

Plaintiff

Salt Lake County,

is a bona fide and actual resident

of

State of Utah and has been for more than three

months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.
having

That

Plaintiff

and Defendant

been married at Salt Lake County,

are

husband

and

wife

State of Utah on June

19, 1976.
Provisions Relating the Chi Id Custody and Support
3.

That the parties

issue of this marriage,

have

two (2) minor children born

namely;

ANNE EBBERT,

1980 and AMY EBBERT, born June 16, 1982.

1

as

born February 14,

4.

Defendant

should

be awarded

the

care,

custody

and

control of the parties' minor children subject to the Defendant's
right to liberal visitation at minimum as follows:
a.

Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until

Sunday at 6:00
b.

p.m.;

One night during the week from 6:00 p.m. until

9:00

p.m.;
c.

Every

other

red-letter holiday

(e.g.

Labor Day, etc.,) from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00
d.
e.

All day on alternate Thanksgiving

July

4th,

p.m.;
Day;

With Defendant on Christmas Eve and until noon en

Christmas

day

and

with Plaintiff' from noon on Christmas

Day and for the four (4) following days;
f.

Half day on each child's

g.

All

day

birthday.

with Defendant on Mother's Day

and with

Plaintiff on Father's Day.
h.

For one week for each month of the minor children's

summer vacation for a minimum of three (3) weeks.
i.

Any

other visitation as mutually-agreed

upon

by

both parties hereto.
5.

Plaintiff

should

be

allowed to retain

all

entitlements with the parties' minor children as if the
were

not

divorced,

such as thw right to attend

parental
parties

parent/teacher

conference, and to receive notice of illness or injury to child.
6.

It

is

reasonable

that Plaintiff should
2

pay

to

the

Defendant a reasonable sum for the support and maintenance of the

parties 1 two minor children.
Provisions Relating to Grounds
7.
causing

That

the

Plaintiff

Defendant has treated the Plaintiff
great mental distress and thereby

cruelly

making

it

impossible to continue the marriage.
Provis ions Relating to Alimony
8.

Neither party should be awarded

alimony.

Provisions Relating the Real Property
9.
acquired

That during the course of the marriage the parties have
real
a.

property which should be awarded as follows:
The

real property at 723,8 South 1710

East,

Salt

Lake City, Utah should be awarded to Plaintiff subject tc no
lien by Defendant;
b.
Lake

The

City,

real property at 7389 South 1710

East,

Utah should be awarded to Defendant subject

her assumption of any mortgages or liens thereon.
should

Salt
tc

Plaintiff

execute a quit claim deed releasing his interest

in

said property to the Defendant subject to a lien in favor of
Plaintiff
paid

to

following

in the sum of $25,000.00.

Said lien

should

Plaintiff at the time of the first of any
occurences:

Defendant remarries or

be

of the

cohabitates

with a member of the opposite sex who is not a relative; the
residence
the

is sold or is no longer the primary residence

Defendant;

there are no minor children of the
3

of

parties

residing with Defendant at said residence.
Prov1sions Relating to
10.

During

the

Personal

Property

course of the marriage

the

parties

have

acquired personal property which should be awarded as outlined
Exhibit "A" attached

hereto.

Provisions Relating to Debts and
11.

It

in

Obiigations

is reasonable that the indebtedness of the

parties

should be assumed and paid as follows:
a.

Plaintiff

should

harmless

from,

Defendant
7238

South

1710

East,

assume

and

pay,

holding

the

the mortgage on the residence at
Salt

Lake

City,

Utah,

and

the

holding

the

indebtedness to Arthur Frank's.
b.

Defendant

should

assume

and

pay,

Plaintiff harmless therefrom, any mortgages and liens on the
residence at 7389 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
the

debts owing Z C M I ,

Weinstocks, Nordstroms, Sears, VISA,

American Express, and the continental B a n ^ o n s o l idation
Provi sions Relating to Hea 1th, Dental and Life
12.
a

It

health

is

reasonable

Insurance

that the Plaintiff should

insurance policy on the parties' minor

such

is made available to him through his place

Each

party

medical,
behalf
by

should

dental,

be

ordered to pay

orthodontic,

one-half

plaintiff

maintain

children
of

when

employment.

(1/2)

of

all

and optical expenses incurred en

of the minor children when such expenses are not

insurance,

lean.

should be required to maintain
4

covered
a

life

policy

named

sole irrevocable beneficiaries in the minimum

as

on

himself

with

the p a r t i e s 1

insurance

minor

children

sum

of

$25,000.00 each.
Provisions Relating to Income Taxes and Exemptions
13.

It is reasonable that the Plaintiff should be entitled

to claim the parties' minor children as dependants for income tax
purposes.
Provis ions Relating
14.
attorney's

Attorney's Fees

It is reasonable that the Plaintiff should pay his own
fees

incurred in this matter as long as

remains uncontested.
the

to

Defendant

In the event the matter becomes

the

matter

contested

should be ordered to pa,y all attorney's fees

and

court costs as deemed equitable by the Court.
WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff

prays for a Decree of Divorce and

award of property as set forth in the Complaint.
DATED this / f

day of

- U vi'g", / _7

/1985,/

KENN M. HANSON
/
Attorney for Plaintiff

5
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Exhibit

"A"

Eddie Clarence Ebbert vs. Barbara E. Ebbert
Proposed distribution of parties personal

property.

Plaintiff, Eddie Clarence Ebbert, should be awarded the following
items of personal property:
Sony portable television
Magnavox 19" television
Minolta camera
Cannon camera
Movie camera and projector
Chaise Lounge and chair of lawn furniture
Gas barbecue
Office furniture and fixtures
Gold couch
Two (2) gold chairs
Small china hutch
One (1 ) end table
One (1 ) coffee table
Clear crystal
Kirby vacuum cleaner
Dining room furniture
Two (2) lamps
Stocks/savings plan
C.D.s
Defendant, Barbara Ann Ebbert,
items of personal property:

should be awarded the following

Sony 12" television
G.E. 19" television
Quasar VCR
Bedroom furniture
1982 Buick Skylark
Disc camera
Kodamatic
Lawn furniture other than that specifically awarded to Plaintiff
Barbeque
Sewing machine
Three (3) couches
Three (3) chairs
Large china hutch
Small cabinet
Two (2) end tables
One (1 ) coffee table
Television stand

1

ftefrigerator
Washer and dryer
Microwave oven

Towels and 1inens
Lawnmower
Smoked crystal
Stoneware
Crystal punch set
N o r i t a k e china
Gorham Hispana s i l v e r w a r e
S i l v e r including ice b u c k e t , tea s e t , nut d i s h e s and heating dish
Art
H o o v e r and small vacuum c l e a n e r s
Toaster
Can o p e n e r
Cuisinart
W a f f l e iron
Ice and Easy
Coffee m a k e r
Two (2) irons
Mixer
Hand m i x e r
Dining room set
Two (2) lamps

2

8

PROPERTY
Sony P o r t . T.V.
Sony 1 2 "
Mag*>»t*X r V ft

.,

VALUE
150
350
400

ED
150

BABBABA
350

400

G.E. 19 " TV

500

500

Quasar VCR

550

550

1.000

1,000

Bedrooms

600

600

100

100

Car 82 Buick

3,000

3,000

Cmeras

45
45
90
250
300
250
680
150
75
300
2,000
200
200
300
500
?5
75

Disc
Kodamatic
Minolta
Cannon
Projector
Movie
Lawn Furn.
Bar B Q
Sewing Machine
Office:
Couches

Chairs

China Hutches

485,
75
300

2,000
200
200
300
500
75
75

75

75
200
200
1,^00

500

End tables

5°
50
50
50
50
300

T.V. Stand

90
250
300
250
195
150

200
200
,400
300

Small cabnet

Coffee Tables

j*5
^

300
500
50
50
50
50
50
300

VALUE

400

Refirig.
Washer & Dryer

1,000

Micro Wave

1,200

Lawn Mower

300

Towels and Linens

400
7

Clear Crystal
Smoked Crystal

7

Stoneware

150

Crystal punch set

300

China

Noritake 12 sets
with servings.
Savanah
Arvana

Silver ware
Gorham Hispana

800
1,000
1,600

Silver 2 cake, Ice bucket,
Tea Set, 2 nut dishes,
600
Heating dish:
i
1,200

Art
Vacume cleaners

Toaster
Can opener
Cuisinart
Waffle Iron
Ice & Easy
Coffee
2 Irons
Mixer
Hand mixer
Dining Rooms

Kirby
Hoover
Small

100
200
100
50

35
80
40
40
60

?o
200

35
5,000
150

BARBARA

VALUK

ED

85
85
85
85
5,000
4,600

85

5,000
4,600

Small House

25,000

25,000

Large House

65,000

25,6?5

39,325

130,460

65,230

65,230

Lamps

Stocks
C.D.'s

Totals

85

85
85

I will want the right to keep my dog at the large house for at
least one year.
I will also want to be able to use of the large house for
storage for one year.

JUL?2

JAMES P. COWLEY
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
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Attorneys for Defendant
BARBARA ANN EBBERT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT,
Plaintiff,

:

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.

:

Civil No. D85-2144

BARBARA ANN EBBERT,

:

Judge:

Defendant.

Phillip Fishier

:

ANSWER

The Defendant by way of Answer to the Plaintiff's
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as follows:

Paragraphs

1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Plaintiff's Complaint are admitted.
2.

Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and

14 of the Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.
COUNTERCLAIM
By way of Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, the
Defendant alleges as follows:

1. The Defendant is an actual and bona fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has been for
more than three months prior to the filing of Complaint by
Plaintiff.
2.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married

to each other in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 19, 1976.
3.
riage.

Two children have been born issue of the mar-

Both of these children are dependant and their names

and birth dates are as follow:
Anne Ebbert

February 14, 1980

Amy Ebbert

June 16, 1982

4.

The Plaintiff is gainfully employed and has

substantial income therefrom.

The Defendant is gainfully

employed, but the income from her employment is modest.
5.

The parties have during the marriage accumu-

lated substantial assets and have incurred some liabilities.
6.

The Plaintiff has treated the Defendant cruelly

causing her great mental anguish, pain and suffering.
WHEREFORE, The Defendant prays for a judgment as
follows:
1.

Upon the Plaintiff's Complaint, for a judgment

in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, no
cause of action.
2.

Upon the Defendant's Counterclaim for a Judgment

as follows:

-2-

a.

Granting to her a Judgment and Decree di-

vorcing her from the Plaintiff.
b.

Awarding to her the care, custody, and

control of the minor children who are issue of the marriage,
reserving to the Plaintiff the right to visit with said
children at all reasonable times and places.
c.

For an Order requiring the Plaintiff to

pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum for the support
of the minor children who are the issue of the marriage
and for such other matters relating to support of said
children as the Court may deem appropriate and advisable
in the premises.
d.

For an equitable division between the parties

of the assets accumulated during the marriage.
e.

For an Order of the Court requiring the

Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum as
alimony for the support of the Defendant and for such
other matters with respect to the support of the Defendant
as the Court deems advisable in the premises.
f.

For an Order and Judgment requiring the

Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum as
attorney's fees for the use and benefit of the Defendant's
attorneys in this matter together with all costs incurred
herein.
-3-

+.

g.

[I

For such other relief as the Court deems

just, equitable and appropriate under the circumstances
DATED this

^ X ~ day of

L _Sk

1985

AHES P. COWLEY
/of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
0 South Main Street
12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

Attorneys for Defendant
Barbara Ann Ebbert
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim
this

^

day of

p<L^->^

, 1985, postage prepaid,

Kenn M. Hanson, Esq.
HASKINS & HANSON
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah
84107

-4-
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Kenn M. Hanson, #1355
HASKINS & HANSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: 268-3994

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT
Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

vs.

Civil No. D85-2144

BARBARA ANN EBBERT

Judge Phillip Fishier

Defendant.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff above-named, by and through his counsel, Kenn M. Hanson, and answers Defendants Counterclaim admitting
and denying as follows:
1.

Plaintiff admits the allegations of paragraphs one (1),

two (2) and three (3).
2.

Plaintiff admits that Plaintiff is gainfully employed and

that Defendant is gainfully employed, but denies the remainder of
the allegations of paragraph four (4).
3.

Plaintiff admits the allegations of paragraph five (5).

4.

Plaintiff denies the allegations of paragraph six (6).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendant's Counterclaim be
dismissed and she take nothing thereby.

25

DATED this

^"7

day of

lOr*

<.-7C^ /

. 1985

KENN M. HANSON /
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing Answer to Counterclaim to James P. Cowley, Attorney for

the

Defendant, 310 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this 27th day of August, 1985.

-2-

APPENDIX B

PAGES OF THE LAST FOUR PROPOSED STIPULATIONS

Fact and Conclusions of Law,

and good cause appearing, the Court

now makes and enters its
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Each

party is given and granted a Judgment and

divorcing that party from the other.

decree

The same shall become final

immediately upon the entry hereof.
2.

The care, custody and control of the two minor children

who are issue of the marriage is granted to Defendant, subject to
Plaintiff
children
have

being

awarded visitation rights with the

said

which include the right to visit the children

minor

and

the children visit him at any and all reasonable times

and

places.

The Plaintiff is accorded all parental entitlements with

respect

to

the

minor children including

attending parent/teacher conference,
receive
children.
not
move

less
or

but

not

limited

to

doctor appointments, and to

immediate notice of illness or injury with regard to the
The Defendant shall give the Plaintiff written notice
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Plaintiff and Defendant are fit and proper

to
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Each party has
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other to suffer great mental pain, anguish and duress.
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custody and control of the

the

be

accorded all

minor

children

parental

including but

attending parent/teacher conference,

parties 1
should

children

which

and

the

children

places.

The

entitlements

with

not

limited

The Defendant

not

than thirty

less

to

doctor appointments, and to

receive immediate notice of illness or injury with regard to
children.

be

being

minor

times

and

Plaintiff

right to visit the children and have
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14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert,
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(2)

of

the

should give the Plaintiff written notice

(30) days in advance of her
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intention

to
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Based upon the pleadings on file herein, and
stipulation of the parties, the exhibits received and
the testimony of the parties, and the Court having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes
and enters its
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.
2 2
( X CO

Each party is given and granted a Judgment

and Decree divorcing that party from the other.

The

same shall become final immediately upon the entry
hereof.

i 2 ••

• i°
o u

°i
J

2.

The care, custody and control of the two minor

children who are issue of the marriage is granted to
Defendant, subject to the Plaintiff being awarded visitation rights with the said minor children which include
the right to visit the children and have the children
visit him at any and all reasonable times and places.
The Plaintiff is accorded all parental entitlements
with respect to the minor children including but not
limited to attending parent/teacher conference, doctor
appointments, and to receive immediate notice of illness
or injury with regard to the children.

The Defendant
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Plaintiff appeals from an order relative to the
modification of a decree of divorce which treated a putative
stipulation as dispositive of all issues. We reverse and remand.
The parties were married on June 4, 1969. Three children
were born to the Browns; all of whom are still minors at the
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physician with a practice
located in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's
degree and was not employed at the time of divorce. The amended
decree of divorce was signed on February 21, 1980. The salient
provisions were: plaintiff would have custody of the children
subject to specified visitation rights; defendant would pay
child support in the amount of $300.00 per child per month for a
total of $900.00 per month; defendant would pay $900.00 per
month as alimony which would cease if plaintiff remarried or
cohabited with a male; and plaintiff would not be able to seek
an increase in support or alimony for 36 months after the date
of the decree.
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition for
modification of the decree of divorce which was based on a
significant increase in defendants gross income and a material
change in plaintiff's circumstances. The two most important
requests for modification were for increases in alimony and
child support to $1,500.00 per month and $500.00 per child per
month, respectively. Defendant counterpetitioned for
termination of alimony and for expanded visitation rights.

During the next fifteen months discovery and settlement
negotiations took place* Plaintifffs deposition was scheduled
for June 5, 1984, in preparation for a trial set for August 14,
1984. Apparently plaintiff's counsel caused opposing counsel to
believe that the issues had been resolved satisfactorily and that
the time scheduled for the taking of plaintiff's deposition could
be used to record the agreement. The parties and their
respective counsel met on the scheduled date and recorded the
agreement at issue before a certified shorthand reporter. In
addition to visitation arrangements/ the agreement provided that/
commencing July 1984, alimony would be reduced from $900.00 per
month to $500.00 per month and would continue for two years at
the lower level before terminating. Child support was increased
from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00 per child per month
with conditions specified when such support would also
terminate. The record indicates that both counsel and defendant
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during the proceedings.
The agreement was subsequently reduced to writing and sent to
plaintiff's counsel. Beginning in July 1984, defendant began
paying the total amount set forth in the agreement/ which
payments were accepted by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that she was not given a copy of the
written agreement until August 1984. She immediately attempted
to consult with her counsel but was unable to see him until late
in September. At that meeting, plaintiff stated that she
believed the agreement to be unfair and refused to sign it. Her
counsel withdrew on November 7, 1984.
On February 14, 1985# defendant filed a motion for an order
approving and enforcing the settlement agreement. On February
25/ 1985/ plaintiff filed an affidavit which stated that her
former counsel had assured her that increases in alimony and
child support were justified and that he was confident she would
win major increases in both; that she was unaware of the tenor oi
the proposed settlement agreement until the day scheduled for he
deposition; that her former counsel informed her that he told
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement; that sh
was "shocked/ dismayed/ dissapointed [sic], and confused" by her
counsel's change in position; that she didn't recall speaking at
the proceeding; and that she refused to sign the written
agreement. A hearing on defendant's motion was held before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March 1985/ who recommended
that the motion be granted. Plaintiff rejected the
recommendation and the motion was argued in Third District Court
in April. The order enforcing the agreement was filed on May 1,
1985/ and plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal. The issi
is whether or not the trial court should have accepted and
enforced the proceedings of June 5, 1984/ as a stipulation
between the parties.

860125-CA

2

It is necessary to begin by looking at what constitutes a
"stipulation11.
A promise or agreement with reference to a
pending judicial proceeding, made by a party
to the proceeding or his attorney, is
binding without consideration. By statute
or rule of court such an agreement is
generally binding only (a) if it is in
writing and signed by the party or attorney,
or (b) if it is made or admitted in the
presence of the court, or (c) to the extent
that justice requires enforcement in view of
material change of position in reliance on
the promise or agreement.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 (1981).
Further,
It has been said that unless it is clear
from the record that^the parties assented,
there is no stipulation, and it is provided
in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or
by statute, that a private agreement or
consent between the parties or their
attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in
a cause, will not be enforced by the court
unless it is evidenced by a writing
subscribed by the party against whom it is
alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or
entered upon the minutes of the court. Any
other rule would require the court to pass
upon the credibility of the attorneys.
73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct. 4.5(b) requires that M[n]o orders,
judgments or decrees upon stipulation shall be signed or entered
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk,
provided that the stipulation may be made orally in open court."
There can be little doubt the rule of practice is concerned with
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as expressed in Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984) 1 which states that certain agreements
1. § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof.
860125-CA
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are void unless in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith. The Statute of Frauds was not interposed as
an affirmative defense below.2
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of
those involved. The parties must have completed their
negotiations either in person or through their attorneys acting
within the rules of agency. The agreement then is reduced to
writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record
before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent
to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated. Not so here.
This agreement was reached between one of the parties and
both counsel. Mrs. Brown remained silent while it was discussed
and read into the record. The proceeding was not done in court
as would be permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at the time of
a deposition before a shorthand reporter. Had it been done in
court a judge would have been involved and would have made
inquiry of the parties, likely while they were both under oath,
if they understood and agreed with the terms. Had Mrs. Brown
remained silent in that scenario it is hard to imagine the court
finding agreement. The same* conclusion is compelled here.
Silence cannot be construed to be assent in these circumstances.
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties must be
evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record
before a judge. The facts in this case do not show such
evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation reached between
the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce.
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no timely objection to
the agreement and accepted the additional $200.00 per month from
him; thus she should be estopped from denying its validity. It
is easily understood why plaintiff accepted the increased
payments. She was confused as to her position, unsure of what
her counsel might do next, and the payments appear to have been
her sole means of support. Any refusal to accept might have
resulted in a delay or cessation of support or increased delays
in determining the status of defendant's obligations. We have
already discussed the time delays plaintiff experienced in
obtaining an appointment with her counsel after she first read
the written agreement. These facts are insufficient to impute a
timeliness issue in accordance with Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472
476 (Utah 1975). Neither do these facts give rise to estoppel.
2. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for payment of alimonj
and child support would fall within the Statute of Frauds since
such an agreement would not be performed within one year from
the making. The putative stipulation here would run for many
years with changes to occur at stated intervals.
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We will not go around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to
create a stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200.00 per month
by plaintiff.3 Whether she is entitled to retain the extra
payments or will be required to credit defendant shall be
determined by the trial court on remand.
In summary, we hold that the putative stipulation of June 5,
1984, fails to meet the requirements of a valid stipulation as
stated above. The order enforcing the agreement is reversed and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further action on
plaintiff's original petition for modification. Costs against
defendant.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
ORME, Judge: (dissenting)
I think what is said in the main opinion about the
requirements for a binding stipulation is correct. I agree the
requirements for a valid stipulation were not met in this case.
However, there are situations where a settlement agreement is
reached—where all parties have had a meeting of the minds as to
the basis for settlement of an action or proceeding—through a
device other than a stipulation. That agreement might be
memorialized by an exchange of letters, dictation to a shorthand
reporter, or even just a handshake. In my view, such agreements,
intended to be binding when made, are enforceable and should be
enforced. They should be enforced even though one party might
have a change of heart or otherwise balk at signing a formal
stipulation designed to implement the valid and binding agreement
previously made. Parties have no right to welch on a settlement
deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the
deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered
on a stipulation.
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earning a
substantial income. The additional $200.00 per month paid on
this putative stipulation represents no hardship and no material
change of circumstances on his part.

860125-CA
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The key in this case, then, is whether appellant assented to
the settlement agreement which was dictated to the reporter in
her presence. She concededly sat mute throughout the
proceeding. Her duly employed attorney, however, manifested
assent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is whether he had
authority to do so.
The facts are in conflict on this point. Appellant suggests
she was stupefied by her former attorney*s betrayal and rendered
unable to speak or, apparently, even to storm out. On the other
hand, it is reasonable to infer, as those present did, that a
principal who says nothing when her agent speaks for her is in
accord with the sentiments expressed by the agent. This
inference is bolstered by evidence which is usually quite
reliable—the subsequent course of conduct of the parties.
Following the apparent agreement, respondent made payment at the
higher level contemplated by the putative settlement and for
several months appellant accepted those payments without
incident. No unfavorable inference would be available from her
merely cashing the checks, which were mostly for amounts clearly
due her. But her retention and use of the extra amount not due
her under the original decree is consistent only with an
understanding that a settlement had been reached—or, I suppose,
of dishonesty on her part* Laypersons fully understand that they
may spend money only if it is theirs. There being nothing to
suggest appellant was dishonest, the fact that she kept the extra
amount rather than returning it tends to show she thought it was
hers to keep; it could be hers to keep only if the decree were
modified, as per the settlement, to increase the monthly total
due for her support and that of the children. Thus, her
retention and use of the larger payments tendered subsequent to
the alleged settlement tends to show she had agreed to the terms
of the settlement.
The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After hearing
the motion to enforce the settlement, which a commissioner
earlier heard and recommended be granted, the trial court made
findings of fact to the effect that appellant was bound by the
settlement. I concede, however, that those findings are not
entitled to the usual deference because the court did not receive
actual testimony. £f. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American
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Savings & Loan. 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 1 The
court received affidavits and counsels' representations about
what the testimony would show. Thus, the trial courtfs usual
advantage in terms of viewing the witnesses and their demeanor
does not obtain in this case. We are in as good a position to
review the affidavits and consider the proffer2 as was the
1. In Diversified Equities, the trial court received an
extensive recitation of facts to which the parties had
stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The trial court then entered
••findings" of fact. We observed: "Generally, a trial court's
findings of fact are accorded great deference. However, without
regard to the labels used, when those "findings" proceed from
stipulated facts . . . the "findings" are tantamount to
conclusions of law, with the stipulation of facts being the
functional equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at
1136. That conclusion is premised on two factors: First, a
disposition based on stipulated facts is "not one involving
resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony."
Schroederv. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
Second, since the facts are written or recited and do not turn
on witness credibility, an appellate court has "the same means
as the trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion of
law . . . ." Stiles v. Brown, 380 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Ala.
1980). Those same factors apply to the affidavits and proffer
which substituted for testimony in the instant case. Although
the conflict between the affidavits should have prompted an
evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we are in as good a
position as was the trial court to read the affidavits and the
proffer and draw logical conclusions therefrom.
2. Fortunately, one of the two attorneys requested that the
hearing be reported or the proffer would be unavailable to us.
Such a hearing should be reported as a matter of course. See
Brioos v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
("Although consistently making a record of all proceedings
imposes a greater burden on the trial court and court reporters,
it is impossible for an appellate court to review what may
ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record of
them has been made.").
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trial court.3 After considering these items, I agree with rne
commissioner and the trial judge that the facts more readily
support the conclusion that appellant initially agreed to the
settlement and then had a change of heart than the conclusion
that she never agreed but was rendered unable to say so and
simply regarded the extra amounts tendered as a coincidental gift
from her ex-husband.
I would affirm.

Gregory K. Orme# Judge

3. In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would probably have
been preferable. Had the testimony been consistent with the
affidavits and proffer and the same findings made, those findings
would clearly be entitled to the usual deference and the trial
court's disposition would clearly be entitled to affirmance.
However, neither side requested an evidentiary hearing and
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was entitled to one.
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Plaintiff Karen Marchant and defendant Donald Marchant
were married on September 8, 1967, when they were both college
students. Plaintiff completed one more year of study before
taking a job while defendant continued his education, received
a degree in civil engineering, and completed two semesters of
postgraduate studies. Defendant has been employed by the U. S.
Forest Service for the majority of his working life while
plaintiff did not return to the work force on a full time basis
until late in the marriage.
The Marchants found they were unable to have children and
consequently adopted two infants: a boy in April 1974 and a
girl in April 1977. During 1976, the couple purchased a home
and a farm in Central, Sevier County, Utah and resided there
until their separation.
During 1982, plaintiff began working for a medical
organization which maintained an office in Richfield, Utah.
Defendant appears to have resented both his wife's employment
and the working relationship between plaintiff and her male
supervisor. The previous strains on the marriage grew
correspondingly and the relationship deteriorated. There were
attempts at counseling but these proved unsuccessful. During
an argument concerning the state of the marriage, defendant
struck plaintiff, causing her to lose consciousness. The final
separation followed immediately.

needs, and defendant's ability to provide support. We do not
intend to imply that plaintiff should or should not receive
alimony. That determination is to be made by the trier of fact
and must be supported by adequate findings of fact.
BIAS
In both the docketing statement filed on appeal and in her
appellate briefs, plaintiff alleges bias on the part of the
trial court because she exercised her right to seek a divorce.
The written findings of fact and the judge's oral findings and
rulings at the conclusion of the trial contain statements which
raise this issue. At pages 130-31 of the trial transcript, the
judge stated:
I'll be honest. I have difficulty with
what the Plaintiff sues, alleges grounds.
I have difficulty finding where this
Defendant's done anything wrong, other
than slapping her. Maybe that was
justified. I don't believe in it. I
don't believe anyone should use force and
violence. But I'm having difficulty.
However, under the circumstances I don't
see where I can force them to live
together. So based on that I'm going to
find that the Defendant did treat the
Plaintiff cruelly, causing her physical
and mental anguish, physical anguish
because he struck her on the one occasion
when he was what appeared to me highly
provoked.
This Court cannot accept any rationale for the trial court's
comment concerning defendant's lack of fault "other than
slapping her* which occurred when he was "what appeared to me
highly provoked." We have previously offered our opinion
concerning this all too common expression of an inability to
deal with a differing point of view. We see little reason why
the trial court's findings of fact refer to plaintiff's moving
into an apartment with "another woman who is divorced" or the
nonspecific comment as to plaintiff's lifestyle. However, we
stress that the issue of bias was not brought up in the court
below pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). This issue arises, in
our minds, through the judge's comments and rulings at trial.
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948), noting that an
affidavit of bias and prejudice is treated differently today
than it was in 1948. Justice Wolfe, writing for the Court,
stated:
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The purity and integrity of the judicial
process ought to be protected against any
taint of suspicion to the end that the
public and litigants may have the highest
confidence in the integrity and fairness
of the courts.
Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this point
when he wrote:

One of the most important things in
government is that all persons subject to
its jurisdiction shall always be able to
obtain a fair and impartial trial in all
matters of litigation in its courts. It
is nearly as important that the people
have absolute confidence in the integrity
of the courts. I can think of nothing
that would as surely bring the courts into
disrepute as for a judge to insist on
trying a case where one of the litigants
believes that such judge is biased and
prejudiced against him.
Id. at 526.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues
excluding the granting of the divorce/ which is affirmed,
Costs against defendant.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

R. W. Garff/ Judge
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Defendant appeals an order of the Third District Court
refusing to stay the accrual of interest on a judgment for
delinquent child support payments. We affirm.
Plaintiff Karen W. Stroud and defendant James M. Stroud
were divorced on June 20, 1972. The decree granted plaintiff
care, custody, and control of the couple's two minor children.
The decree also ordered defendant to pay child support of
$75.00 per child per month. On September 20, 1983/ the trial
court issued an order to show cause why judgment should not be
entered against defendant for past due child support. At a
hearing on March 6, 1984, the trial court found in favor of
plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay her $18,815.00 in
principal and interest plus attorney fees and court costs, with
interest on the unpaid balance to accrue at 12% per annum until
paid. The court issued its findings, conclusions, and order on
March 15, 1984.
Defendant filed a motion to amend the judgment on June 8,
1984. Defendant asked the court to stay execution of the
judgment provided defendant make payments of $300.00 per
month.1 Defendant also requested the court to prohibit the
accrual of interest on the unpaid judgment provided he remain
1. Initially, defendant would pay $150.00 per month child
support and $150.00 per month on the judgment. In February,
1985, the older child would reach majority and the child
support payment would decrease to $75.00 while the judgment
payment would increase to $225.00.

current on his payments. In an order issued July 19, 1984, the
court granted defendant's motion to stay execution of the
judgment provided payments were made. However, the court
concluded, under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986), it could not
waive the interest on a judgment. Defendant filed a notice of
appeal on July 31, 1984.
On appeal, defendant contends Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
(1979) grants a trial court the authority to suspend interest
payments when such action is determined to be equitable.
Therefore, argues defendant, the trial court erred in ruling it
had no power to stay the accrual of interest.
Section 15-1-4 provides that, unless otherwise specified
by contract, H. . . judgments shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum." (Emphasis added.) Defendant suggests where
equity requires, this statute may be ignored under section
30-3-5(1) (1979) which states, "When a decree of divorce is
rendered, the court may make such orders in relation to the
children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable
" 2 Defendant
cites Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 P.2d 231 (1971),
and Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), in support of his
argument.
In Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's
stay of execution on a judgment for support arrearages using
the following rationale:
In order to carry out the important
responsibility of safeguarding the interests
and welfare of children, it has always been
deemed that the courts have broad equitable
powers. To accept the plaintiff's contention
that an adjudged arrearage is tantamount to a
judgment in law, would in the long run tend
to impair rather than to enhance the
abilities of both the plaintiff and the court
to accomplish the desired objective. Such a
judgment at law does not have the valuable
and useful attribute which allows its
enforcement by contempt measures. For the
foregoing reasons decrees and orders in
divorce proceedings are of a different and
higher character than judgments in suits of
law; and by their nature are better suited to
the purpose of protecting the interests and
welfare of children. . . . [W]here it
2. In 1985, this section was amended to read, •'When a decree
of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable
orders relating to the children, property, and parties. . . ."
The amendments have no effect on the issue raised in the
present case.
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appears to be in the furtherance of the
courtfs responsibility of safeguarding the
welfare of children, the District Court may
upon conditions which he deems appropriate
and consistent with that objective, make an
order such as the one here under attack,
staying the issuance of execution.
Harmon. 491 P.2d at 232, 233. In the instant case, the trial
court appropriately exercised its discretion and stayed execution
of the judgment.
In Pope, the trial court, in dividing the marital property,
ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $24,984.00. Apparently in
order to induce defendant to pay the money within six months, the
court ordered that if the amount remained unpaid after the six
month period, then interest would increase from the then statutory
rate of eight percent to ten percent. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court#s order and held, "Sec. 15-1-4, which
requires. . . judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight
percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under Sec.
30-3-5 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight percent
where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and
equitable.- 589 P.2d at 754.
Defendant claims the breadth of discretion exercised by the
trial court in Harmon and Pope and affirmed by the Supreme Court
is similar to the discretion the trial court in this case claimed
it did not have. Defendant argues that, if, under Pope, the trial
court has the discretion to raise the interest rate on a judgment
in a divorce decree, the court also has the discretion to stay the
accrual of interest on the judgment.
This approach is contrary to law. Section 15-1-4 states
judgments H shall H bear the statutory rate of interest. According
to the Utah Supreme Court, the meaning of the word shall is
usually or ordinarily presumed to be mandatory. Herr v. Salt Lake
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d 45,
347 P.2d 1111 (1960). Section 15-1-4 is a very specific statute
while section 30-3-5(1) is much more general. "When two statutory
provisions appear to conflict, the more specific provision will
govern over the more general provision." Perry v. Pioneer
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984).
Furthermore, when principles of equity confront rules of law,
-equity follows the law.- McDermott v. McDermott, 628 P.2d 959,
960 (Ariz. App. 1981). The Court of Appeals of Arizona states,
- . . . courts of equity are as much bound by plain and positive
provisions of statute as are courts of law and where rights are
clearly established and defined by statute, equity has no power to
change or upset such rights.- Stokes v. Stokes, 694 P.2d 1204,
1208 (Ariz. App. 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court has held one who obtains a judgment for
unpaid maintenance and support is entitled to interest thereon
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until paid. In Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580
(1967), the trial court awarded a judgment for unpaid alimony
under a Nevada divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment, and, in response to defendant's request to modify the
accrued installments, held, "The right to such accrued installment
payments vested in the plaintiff upon the due date of each
installment, and the plaintiff is entitled to interest thereon at
the legal rate until payment is made/ !£. at 583. (Emphasis
added.) See also McKav v. McKav* 13 Utah 2d 187, 370 P.2d 358
(1962); Larsen v. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421 (1959); Cole
v. Cole. 101 Utah 355, 122 P.2d 201 (1942).
The general rule that a spouse is entitled to interest on a
judgment for support arrearages until paid is followed in several
other jurisdictions. Jarvis v. Jarvis. 27 Ariz. App. 266, 553
P.2d 1251 (1976); In re Marriage of Popenhaaer, 99 Cal. App. 3d

514, 160 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1979);

m re Marriage Qt Schvtte, 721

P.2d 160 (Colo. App. 1986); Strand v. Despain, 79 Ida. 304, 316
P.2d 262 (1957); Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 430 So.2d 280 (La. App.
1983); Rubisoff v. Rubisoff. 242 Miss. 225, 133 So.2d 534 (1961);
Gardner v. Gardner, 253 S.C. 325, 170 S.E.2d 372 (1969). The
Colorado Court of Appeals specifically held, under a statute
similar to section 15-1-4, H. . . the trial court is without
discretion to deny interest.H Schutte, 721 P.2d at 162. See also
Popenhaaer, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
We hold a judgment for child support arrearages is a judgment
under section 15-1-4.3 The custodial spouse is entitled to the
statutory rate of interest on the judgment until payment in full.
Although the trial court may, in its discretion under section
30-3-5, raise the statutory interest if equity so requires, the
court does not have the discretion to lower, stay, or waive
interest.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR:

R. W. Garff, Judge

3. Our decision falls squarely within the spirit and intent of
newly enacted Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(1)(a)(1987): -Each paymei
or installment of child or spousal support under any child suppori
order . . . is, on and after the date it is due: (a) a judgment
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district
court . . . .H
860049-CA
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GREENWOOD, J. (Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The Utah
Supreme Court1s holding in Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah
1978), I believe, mandates a decision that in divorce
proceedings a trial court judge may, as a matter of law, bar
the accrual of interest or decrease the rate of interest from
that statutorily established on a judgment if the equities in a
divorce proceeding justify such action.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, Pope upheld the
power of the judge to require payment of interest at a rate
higher than that statutorily imposed, if the judgment debtor
failed to pay the judgment for child support arrearages within
a specified time. Similarly in this case, appellant wished to
argue for an abatement of interest accrual if he made payments
on the judgment as agreed. Both involved only prospective
interest accrual, and would provide an incentive to the debtor
to make payments as ordered by the court.
The majority contends that the statutory interest is
mandatory, first, because the word "shall" in Utah Code Ann.
§ 15-1-4 (1986) eliminates the possibility of any discretion,
and second, because the general provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(1) must be governed by the more specific provisions of
§ 15-1-4. However, Pope deviates from the statutory rate
despite the conflict between the two statutes and the
compulsory "must" in § 15-1-4. In fact, Pope, in effect,
establishes that § 30-3-5(1) controls § 15-1-4, contrary to the
majority opinion. As stated in Pope, "Sec. 15-1-4, which
requires . . . judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight
percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under
Sec. 30-3-5 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight
percent where, under the circumstances, that award is
reasonable and equitable." lei. at 754.
Furthermore, consistent with Pope, the trial judge in
domestic matters should have considerable latitude in
exercising the court's discretion and equitable powers to
fashion remedies which best serve not only the parties, but,
more importantly, the children of the parties. It is certainly
conceivable that the court could reason that a delinquent
support obligor would be more likely to pay such a judgment
with an abatement or suppression of interest that would allow
for an eventual satisfaction of the judgment. As a matter of
policy, this may be preferable to no payments at all. The
trial judge is in the best position to determine the method
most likely to actually produce support payments.
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To try to distinguish Pope and allow higher, but not lower
than the statutory interest rate violates principals of
fairness and evenhandedness. It would be more consistent to
overrule Pope. However, given the precedent of Pope. I believe
this Court should reverse and hold that in divorce cases the
court may prospectively reduce or suspend interest accrual on
judgments for delinquent child support, as a legitimate
exercise of the equitable powers of the court.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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